Safety studies show that DOO need not be dangerous

Here’s a conclusion to start: “A review of the safety implications of DOO(P) indicated that there may be changes to the risk profile, in terms of the likelihood of events occurring, or the severity of their consequences. However, with the right technical and operational mitigations the analysis has considered the provision of DOO(P) to be safety neutral.”

That means that when done properly, having the driver controlling the opening and closing of passenger trains doors makes no difference to safety. The conclusion comes from a report from Rail Standards and Safety Board (RSSB) in March 2015. Predictably, the RMT union attacked RSSB, claiming that because it was funded by rail companies, including train operators, it could not be trusted.

As the battle about guards controlling trains doors continued at Southern and ScotRail, RMT General Secretary Mick Cash said: “The RSSB is funded by the train companies so of course they are going to wade in to support one of their financial backers in this dispute over the safety-critical role of the guards. They are bought and sold by the TOCs and the idea that they are independent is ludicrous.”

Instead, the RMT published its own dossier which it said revealed the dangers of driver-only operation (DOO). In doing this, the RMT has asked people to reject one organisation’s reports because it’s not independent and instead asked them to believe its own report. That’s not a strong argument.

Cash says in the dossier’s introduction: “Everyone who works on the railway knows that the Passenger/Train Interface (PTI) is the number one area of risk. That fact is accepted by the safety agencies that monitor and manage the safety regime across the rail network.”

According to RSSB’s safety risk model, the biggest risk for passengers comes from slips, trips and falls, with the increase it recorded in 2014 coming from an observed rise in slips, trips and falls on stairs and escalators. So Cash is wrong.

The RMT’s dossier lists ten examples of accidents at the passenger/train interface over the last five years. The ten were subject to investigation by the Rail Accidents Investigation Branch (RAIB). Eight involved DOO services and two involved a guard (one of which – James Street Station in October 2011 – led to the guard being jailed for manslaughter). In seven cases, passengers became trapped in the doors, with one of them on a service with a guard.

A guard can certainly prevent accidents in which passengers become trapped in doors and dragged along as the train starts to move. So can a driver who correctly checks the doors of his train before closing them and moving away. Drivers use mirrors on platforms or CCTV monitors in cabs or on platforms to check doors. In some cases, a staff member might be provided on the platform to help the process. This depends on the circumstances of the platform, it might be very busy at certain times of the day or be curved.

The RMT’s dossier says: “The RMT believes that if there is any doubt when performing pre-departure safety checks that it is safe to dispatch the train then drivers should perform a visual check and not rely solely on CCTV, stepping out onto the platform if necessary.” Which acknowledges that DOO can be done safely.

The union argues that having a guard is better because they can help passengers. This is what Southern plans to have with its new on-board supervisors’ role into which it wants guards to transfer. This means that there will be no job cuts, as RMT Assistant General Secretary Mick Lynch acknowledged on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme on June 21. Southern has also said that there will be no pay cuts as a result of this change.

Lynch argued that the strikes called by RMT were about safety although Cash later on June 21 muddied the waters when he said in a press release: “We regret the inconvenience to passengers but our fight for jobs today is about protecting your safety tomorrow”.

In addition to conducting research into rail safety, the RSSB also collates and publishes statistics of accident rates, helping focus effort on reducing them. They record the passenger and public harm from boarding and alighting incidents. The results come in a measure known as ‘fatalities and weighted injuries’ (FWI). They give a measure of the rates of different types of incidents. According to its 2014-15 annual report, over the last five years, ‘fall between train and platform’ rates are in the range 1.3-1.9, ‘caught in train doors’ 0.6-0.7, ‘other alighting accident’ 2.3-3.1 and ‘other boarding accident’ 1.2-1.7. This shows that being caught in train doors is the least risky category. The RSSB explains that the ‘other’ category generally comprises of trips into or out of trains. In either case, having a guard or on-board supervisor makes no difference to the trip although either of them, or other passengers (or the driver if you’re spreadeagled on the platform) can summon help.

RSSB has also examined real DOO, that is having the driver as the sole member of staff on board, rather than plans such as Southern’s to have a second member on board, which RMT is fighting.

This report dates from 2014 and looked at extending DOO onto regional lines. It notes that having just a driver makes it impossible for passengers needing assistance to simply turn up and board. The clearest example of such assistance would be having staff on hand to deploy ramps to allow wheelchairs on or off trains. Given that the report considers regional lines, it’s very unlikely there would be level access between platform and train.

The report says: “Assisted travel would have to move to a booking system where passengers who required assistance would have to book in advance where they would be met to be assisted on and off the train. Hazards arise if people turn up without a booking and attempt to board but it is believed that the majority of cases would be captured by educating passengers.”

I suspect that education would just teach potential passengers not to bother with rail. That reinforces the case for having a second staff member on trains. But they need not be a guard.

RSSB notes that a driver alone may find it difficult to control passengers if a train is badly delayed. He may be busy trying to discover or fix a problem and not able to keep broadcasting messages to reassure passengers. These situations can easily run out of control. Passengers open doors to escape which means the train cannot then move. I witnessed this in Manchester the other year on a very crowded tram that was being held just outside Victoria station because the tram in front had failed. Eventually we were evacuated because, despite the broken tram being moved, we could not get all the doors shut at the same time to allow us to move. And that was with several staff on hand to help.

There’s a plan to help lone drivers keep contact with passengers with a modification to train GSM-R radios that allow control office staff to broadcast directly over trains tannoys. This allows the driver to concentrate on fixing the problem.

This 2014 report matches the conclusion of 2015’s when it says: “A broad analysis of incidents (exact comparisons are impossible) and the related risk levels shows that there is no significant difference in the number of dispatch incidents between DOO(P) and conventional dispatch, suggesting that if used at appropriate locations, DOO(P) dispatch is not necessarily associated with an increased risk.”

It’s unpalatable to the rail unions, the RMT in particular, but recorded safety statistics and several studies don’t support their claims that DOO is unsafe.

This article first appeared in RAIL 804, published July 6 2016. For more about the magazine see railmagazine.com

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Philip Haigh

Freelance railway writer, former deputy editor at RAIL magazine - news, views and analysis of today's railway.

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